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COMMENT
THE IMPUTED SALE AND ANTICIPATORY ASSIGNMENT OF INCOME
DOCTRINES: THEIR EFFECT ON IRC §§ 311 & 336
Section 3111 of the Internal Revenue Code referring to non-liquidating dis-
tributions states ". . . no gain or loss shall be recognized to a corporation on
the distributions, with respect to its stock, of . . .property." The same prin-
ciple applies to liquidating distributions under section 336.2 Suppose a corpora-
tion holds investment stock having a market value of $110, purchased by the
corporation sometime ago for $10. Were it to sell the stock and distribute the
proceeds, those proceeds would be reduced by $25 by federal income taxes
(assuming capital gains treatment) leaving $85 available for the dividend.
However, if it were to distribute the investment stock itself, as a dividend in
kind, a $110 asset would be available to the shareholders.8 Presumably, they
could sell the stock themselves and avoid the tax on the corporate level.4 Yet, the
tax avoidance may not succeed even though the letter of section 311 would
seem to apply, because sections 311 and 336 are not to be read literally.
The problem of corporate distributions of appreciated property reached
the Supreme Court in 1935 when it decided General Utilities and Operating Co.
v. Helvering.5 A corporation was held to have realized no income on the dis-
tribution of appreciated stock as a dividend to its stockholders. The case has
been cited as authority for the proposition that a corporation realizes no income
on a dividend distribution of appreciated property." Although it has been force-
fully argued that the Court's comments supporting that non-realization propo-
sition are dictum, 7 the Senate Finance Committee in its report on the 1954 Code
refers to section 311 as incorporating that same interpretation of General Utili-
ties.8 However, while adopting the rule of non-realization upon corporate dis-
1. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 311. The section lists three types of property which do
not qualify for the non-recognition benefits; Lifo inventoried goods, properties with liabili-
ties in excess of basis, and certain installment obligations.
2. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 336. ". . . no gain or loss shall be recognized to a
corporation on distribution of its property in partial or complete liquidation."
3. The distributee would pay tax on whatever he received. Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 301.
For a discussion of the effects upon a corporation distributing appreciated property with
appreciation in excess of surplus, see Block, Non Liquidating Corporate Distributions:
Effect on Income and Earnings and Profit, N.Y.U. 17 Inst. on Fed. Tax 267 (1959).
4. The reverse twist occurs when a corporation distributes "depreciated property,"
that is where its basis exceeds market value. Were a corporation to distribute such property,
neither it nor the shareholders would gain the benefit of the deductible loss The corporation
realized no loss. The stockholder would take into income the market value of the stock
and take an equivalent basis, Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 301. See National Gasoline, 219
F.2d 682 (10th Cir. 1955):; First Savings of Ogden v. Burnet, 53 F.2d 919 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
5. 296 U.S. 200 (1935).
6. E.g., Transport Trading & Terminal Corp., 9 T.C. 247, 256 (1947) rev'd on other
grounds, 176 F.2d, 570 (2d Cir. 1949).
7. Raum, Dividends in Kind: Their Tax Aspects, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 593, 597 (1950);
See Bittker, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders, sec. 5.21, p. 153
(4th ed. 1962).
8. Sen. Rep. No. 1622, 83rd Cong. 2d Sess. (1954), U.S. Cong. & Adm. News 1954,
p. 4677.
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tributions of appreciated property, the report states that the 1954 Code was not
meant to alter the existing law on the subject.9 The existing law recognized two
major circumstances10 where the rule of non-realization was inapplicable. Under
the first exception, the sale is imputed to the corporation on the theory that it is
the corporation which in substance, though not in form, sells the property.
Commissioner v. Court Holding Co."' and United States v. Lynch 12 illustrate
this principle. The other exception involves principles of anticipatory assignment
of income and is illustrated by Commissioner v. First State Bank of Stratford,
1 3
the case cited by the Senate Finance Committee as exemplary of existing law.' 4
This comment is concerned with these two exceptions to the rule of non-realiza-
tion. Their effect on sections 311 and 336 will be dealt with simultaneously since
the same principles and rationale apply to both sections. 15 The case A.B.C.D.
Lands, Inc.,16 a relatively recent case in the area, will be discussed in reference
to each exception since its facts seem to strain the application of both.
I. IMPUTATION TO THE CORPORATION OF A SUBSEQUENT SALE
A. Development of the doctrine
There have been a wealth of cases where the imputed sale theory has been
applied to liquidating corporations. The most prominent of these is Court Hold-
ing Co. where a corporation had negotiated the sale of its sole asset, a substan-
tially appreciated apartment building and had reached an oral agreement as to
the terms of sale. On the day the agreement was to be reduced to writing, the
corporation abandoned the deal in order to avoid the corporate tax on income.
The next day it declared a liquidating dividend of the building to the share-
9. "Your committee does not intend, however, through subsection (a), to alter existing
law in the case of distributions of property, which has appreciated or depreciated in value,
where such distributions are made to persons other than shareholders or are made to share-
holders in a capacity other than that of a shareholder. For example, distribution of property
made to a shareholder in his capacity as a creditor of the distributing corporation is not
within the rule of subsection (a). Likewise your committee does not intend to change
existing law with respect to attribution of income of shareholders to their corporation as exem-
plified for example in the case of Commissioner v. First State Bank of Stratford (168 F.2d
1004, cert. denied, 335 U.S. 867, 69 Sup. CL 137)" Sen. Rep. No. 1622, 83rd Cong. 2d
Sess. 247 (1954), U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News 1954, p. 4884.
10. A third exception arises where appreciated property is given in discharge of an
obligation to a shareholder who stands in the shoes of a creditor. In such a case the
corporation would realize taxable income. Similarly, a corporation's "gift" of appreciated
property to an employee bonus plan, International Freighting Corp. v. Commissioner, 135
F.2d 310, 313 (2d Cir. 1943); Treas. Reg. 1.311-1 (e), or to fund an employee's pension
plan, United States v. General Shoe Corporation, 282 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1960) will create
taxable income. In addition, a distribution of § 1245 or § 1250 property may cause the
recognition of income.
11. 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
12. 192 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 934 (1952); accord, Treas.
Reg. 1. 311-1(a).
13. 168 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1948); cert. denied, 335 U.S. 867 (1948); Note 33 Minn.
L. Rev. 794 (1949).
14. Footnote 9 supra.
15. See Williamson v. United States, 155 Ct. Cl. 279, 286, 292 F.2d 524, 528-9 (1961).
But see United States v. Lynch, 192 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1951).
16. 41 T.C. 840 (1964).
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holders. The shareholders proceeded to sell the building to one of the original
negotiating parties under an agreement containing substantially the same terms
as those embodied in the corporation's oral contract. The Supreme Court affirmed
the Tax Court's finding that the corporation in fact made the sale notwithstand-
ing the fact that the oral contract between the corporation and buyer was un-
enforceable under state law. Therein the court uttered these historic words:
The incidence of taxation depends upon the substance of a transac-
tion. The tax consequences which arise from gains from a sale of prop-
erty are not finally to be determined solely by the means employed to
transfer legal title. Rather, the transaction is to be viewed as a whole
.... A sale by one person cannot be transformed for tax purposes into
a sale by another by using the latter as a conduit through which to
pass title.1
7
Five years later the Supreme Court again faced the issue when it decided United
States v. Cumberland Public Service Co.'8 The case involved a closely held
electric power corporation which serviced certain counties in Kentucky. Since
the Tennessee Valley Authority was moving into the area, the shareholders 9
offered their stock to a local cooperative which was distributing T.V.A. power.
The cooperative wished to buy the company's assets rather than its stock. The
shareholders, desiring to save payment of the corporate capital gains tax, after
offering to sell a portion of the assets, had the corporation partially liquidate,
distributing transmission and distributions systems as a liquidating dividend.
They then sold the systems in accordance with the previous negotiations. The
Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Claims finding that the shareholders were
not a mere conduit for a sale of property by the corporation, but in fact them-
selves sold the property. It is important to note that the corporation must have
anticipated that the shareholders would immediately sell the property and that it
was irrelevant that tax avoidance was a major motive in the transaction. The
court stated:
The subsidiary finding that a major motive of the shareholders
was to reduce taxes does not bar this conclusion. Whatever the motive
and however relevant it may be in determining whether the transac-
tion was real or a sham, sales of physical property by shareholders
following a genuine liquidation distribution cannot be attributed to the
corporation for tax purposes . . . . Congress having determined that
different tax consequences shall flow from different methods by which
the shareholders of a closely held corporation may dispose of corporate
property, we accept its mandate.
20
Note that the Court felt that the tax avoidance motive was not determinative
but only a factor to be considered in determining the genuineness of the trans-
action (the distribution). More important was the question of who began the
17. 324 U.S. at 334.
18. 338 U.S. 451 (1950), affirming 83 F. Supp. 843 (1949).
19. 83 F. Supp. at 855.
20. 338 U.S. 455, 456 (1950).
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negotiations which led to the sale. This was the criteria adopted by the lower
courts. Where the corporation's agent initiated the negotiations, the sale was
imputed to it.21 When the shareholders themselves initiated the negotiations,
the sale was not found imputable to the corporation.22 Where the corporation
had, in fact, terminated negotiations, deciding not to sell, the sale was not im-
puted to it even though the stockholders sold to the same party within a
month,23 the distribution taking place in the interim. Nearly all the cases
involved corporations in complete or partial liquidation.24 Justice Black in the
Cumberland opinion indicated that were it not a liquidating distribution the
opposite result might have prevailed. This assertion is troublesome since the
case25 cited in support of it did not indicate that a going concern might be
taxed on a type of distribution whereas a liquidating concern would not. The
case merely involved a determination of who, in fact, made the sale of a corpora-
tion's assets. It was determined in that case that the trustee in liquidation was
acting on behalf of the corporation, not the shareholders, and therefore, the
sale was imputed to the corporation. However, in 1949 another criteria to test
the genuineness of the distribution emerged from dictum in Commissioner v.
Transport Trading and Terminal Corp.26 There a corporation in 1937 took a
480,000 dollar loss selling to its subsidiary for 20,000 dollars stock in a steam-
ship company. By 1940, after the start of World War II, the value of the stock
had increased to 600,000 dollars. The subsidiary had begun negotiations for
its sale prior to distributing it as a dividend. The Second Circuit found that the
purchaser had made a binding offer to the subsidiary prior to the declaration of
the dividend. The Court also found that the parent, when it caused the subsidiary
to distribute the stock, was determined to demand performance. Hence, the case
could have been decided consistent with the line of cases to that time which
21. Kaufman v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 28 (3rd Cir. 1949); Wichita Terminal Elevator
Co. v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 513 (10th Cir. 1947); Meurer Steel Barrel Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 144 F.2d 282 (3rd Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 860 (1944); Embry Realty Co.
v. Glenn, 116 F.2d 682 (6th Cir. 1940); see Trippett v. Commissioner; 118 F.2d 764 (5th
Cir. 1941) cert. denied, 314 U.S. 644 (1941); Liberty Service Corp. v. Commissioner, 77
F.2d 94 (3rd Cir. 1935); Atlas Steamship Co., 18 B.T.A. 654 (1930); accord, General
Guaranty Mortgage Co. v. Tomlinson, 335 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1964),; H. B. Snively v.
Commissioner, 219 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1955).
22. Wurtsbraugh v. Commissioner, 187 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1951); United States v.
Cummins Distilleries Corp., 166 F.2d 17 (6th Cir. 1948); Howell Turpentine Co. v. Com-
missioner, 162 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1947); McNair Realty Co. v. United States, 188 F. Supp.
451 (D. Mont. 1960); Beaty & Co., 14 T.C. 52 (1950); Ripy Bros. Distillers Inc., 11 T.C.
326 (1948); Acampo Winery & Distilleries Inc., 7 T.C. 629 (1946); accord, Nova Trading
Corp. v. Commissioner, 113 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1940); cf. Chisholm v. Commissioner, 79
F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 641 (1935). But see Guiness v. United States,
109 Ct. Cl. 84, 73 F. Supp. 119 (1947), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 819 (1948).
23. Commissioner v. Falcon Co. 127 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1942).
24. A noteworthy exception is Ripy Bros. Distillers Inc. 11 T.C. 326, (1948) where the
corporation distributed as a dividend in kind warehouse receipts representing barrels of
whiskey. It was held that the corporation did not make the sale.
25. First Nat'l. Bank of Greenley v. United States, 86 F.2d 938 (10th Cir. 1936).
26. 176 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 916 (1950), criticized in
Bierman, Distributions: Gain or Loss to Distributor, N.Y.U. 8th Inst. on Fed. Tax 792,
805 (1950).
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imputed the sale to the distributing corporation where it had initiated the
negotiations. But the court stated:
Even if [the purchaser] had not bound himself to buy the
[shares] ...if an immediate sale was within sure expectation, that
alone might bring the case within such decisions as Gregory v. Helvering
and Fairfield Steamship Corp. v. Commissioner. In short we might
hold that the "distribution" in such circumstances was not the kind of
"distribution" which the statute had in mind; it was not a "dividend"
declared in the ordinary course of business.27
Two years later, in United States v. Lynch,28 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit again dealt with the notion of distribution with expectation of immediate
sale. In Lynch the corporation distributed part of its inventory of apples as a
dividend in kind. Three persons owned all the stock and at the same meeting at
which the dividend was declared, agreed to have the corporation sell the apples
for them. The corporation sold the apples and distributed the proceeds after
deducting the cost of processing and packing. The Court dismissed the argument
that no prior negotiations had been made by the corporation, noting that the
market was good and no solicitation was necessary. It commented upon the fact
that the dividend was declared with the expectation of immediate resale, using
the corporate agency as the vehicle to effectuate the sale. The Court failed to
see a motive for the dividend other than to escape taxation. Citing the Transport
Trading case it stated that the dividend was not the kind contemplated by the
statute and ought to be ignored for tax purposes. However, the decision was
not based simply on the expectation theory but was ". . . a stronger case,
because the sale was to be made by utilizing the corporation's facilities in the
ordinary course of its business .... The shareholders, under the circumstances
of the case, cannot avoid payment of the price Congress had decreed must be
paid for use of the corporate entity."29 Though it thought the expectation of
resale important, the Lynch court imputed the sale to the corporation mainly
because the corporate vehicle was used in the ordinary course of business to sell
the apples 3 0
The state of the law in 1954 was such that it recognized two sets of cir-
cumstances when a sale of appreciated property was deemed to have been made
by the corporation even though the property had been distributed as a dividend
in kind beforehand. The first was when the corporation began the negotiations
which ended in the sale, as in Court Holding Co., and the second, when no
early negotiations were necessary and the corporation's facilities were used in
the subsequent sale, as in Lynch. A somewhat troublesome theory mentioned in
dictum of Transport Trading Co. and Lynch would, if there is no apparent non-
tax motive for the distribution, attribute the sale to the corporation merely
27. Id. at 571 (Emphasis added.)
28. 192 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 934 (1952).
29. Id. at 720.
30. United States v. Horschel, 205 F.2d 646, 650 (9th Cir. 1953).
158
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because of an "expectation" that the shareholders will immediately sell the
property.
B. The 1954 Code and the A.B.C.D. Lands case
The 1954 Code largely eliminated the imputation of sale problem for
liquidating corporations. Under section 33731 if the corporation adopts a plan of
complete liquidation and distributes all of its assets in complete liquidation within
one year, no gain (or loss) from the sale of property within the one year
period will be recognized to the corporation. The result of Court Holding Co.
is thus avoided because a sale by the corporation, even if imputed to it on the
ground that the shareholders acted as a conduit, results in a non-recognized
gain (or loss) if the sale occurs within the 12 month period specified in section
337 (a) .32 However, the problem is very much alive when the imputation to the
corporation of a sale by a shareholder would not be within section 33 7 (a), as is
the case of property distributed as a non-liquidating dividend. A.B.C.D. Lands,
Inc.33 is such a case. The corporation owned farm lands which it leased to
tenant farmers. The leases required the tenants to pay as rent a percentage of
the crops (gain) produced. The lessor did not include the "crop rents" in
income in the year received, relying on an Internal Revenue Regulation,
34
providing that no income shall be recognized until the crops are reduced to cash
or its equivalent. From 1958 to 1961 portions of the grain (which were never
included in income and had a zero basis) were distributed as dividends in kind
to the shareholders.85 Shortly after the distributions, the shareholders either
sold the grain or pledged 36 it under Commodity Credit Corporation loans.
37
31. Section 337 of the 1954 Code provides,
(a) General Rule -If-
(1) A corporation adopts a plan of complete liquidation on or after June 22,
1954, and
(2) Within the 12-month period beginning on the date of the adoption of
such plan, all of the assets of the corporation are distributed in complete
liquidation, less assets retained to meet claims, then no gain or loss shall
be recognized to such corporation from the sale or exchange by it of prop-
erty within such 12-month period.
32. The Senate Finance Committee report states, Section 337 concerns the prob-
lems raised by the decisions in Court Holding Co. and Cumberland "under present law
the tax consequences arising from the sales made in the course of liquidation may depend
primarily upon the formal manner in which the transactions are arranged. Your com-
mittee intends in section 337 to provide a definite rule which will eliminate the present
uncertainties." Sen. Rep. No. 1622, 83rd Cong. 2d Sess. (1954), 3 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News 1954, p. 4896. The section is intended to eliminate the formalities which present a
"trap for the unwary." Id. at 4680.
33. 41 T.C. 840 (1964).
34. Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.61-4(a) "Crop shares (whether or not considered rent under
State law) shall be included in gross income as of the year in which the crop shares are
reduced to money or the equivalent of money."
35. All of the stock of the corporation was held in varying percentages during the
period by the president, his wife, and their son.
36. The stockholders used a local agent, who specialized in the business of farm
management for absentee owners, to arrange the sales or loans with the Commodity Credit
Corporation. The same agent was in the employ of the corporation.
37. It is not necessary to review the workings of the Commodity Credit Corporation or
the character of its "loans" since petitioner elected to have the proceeds of its "loans" treated
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The Tax Court imputed the sale of the appreciated grain to the corporation
because it was made:
with the knowledge and expectation that virtually immediately
thereafter the grains would be sold or pledged by them as security
for CCC loans (and then depending upon market conditions the grains
would either be forfeited or redeemed and sold).38
It found the following facts relevant. The president of the company, before he
set the wheels in motion for the dividend, assured himself that the stockholders
(himself, his wife and child) would be able to dispose of the grains to the
Commodity Credit Corporation. Also the local farm agent, who was the same
one that the corporation used, disposed of the grain for the shareholders and
the distributees took the grain agreeing to pay the agent's 5 per cent fee for his
prior services to the company involving the growth and harvesting of the grain.30
Although the latter facts at least seem to raise a question as to corporate par-
ticipation in the sale, they are not persuasive on this point. The local agent was
the only one available in the area and the distributees had little choice but to
use his services.40 The fact that the shareholders paid part of the corporate
expense to the agent is of little importance if viewed as a distribution in kind
subject to a liability. Under such circumstances, the corporation would recog-
nize the income only to the extent the liability exceeded its basis in the prop-
erty.41 This leaves as the only ground 42 for the holding the fact that the corpora-
tion expected the shareholders to dispose of the grain as soon as possible after
the distribution. Indeed the taxpayer admitted that the method of distribution
was chosen because of the anticipated tax avoidance effect. 43 The critical ques-
tion is: What significance should be accorded to the expectation of tax avoidance
that occurred in A.B.C.D. Lands, Inc.? It is submitted that the expectation
theory is without support either in theory or in precedent.
C. The expectation theory
Perhaps the best way to analyze the expectation theory is to examine its
origin. A.B.C.D. Lands cited the Lynch case which in turn cited the Transport
as income in the year received pursuant to section 77, Int. Rev. Code of 1954. 41 T.C. at 846,
note 10.
38. 41 T.C. at 848. (Emphasis added.)
39. Ibid.
40. Petitioner's Reply Brief, p. 23.
41. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 311(c).
42. The court also indicated that there may have been use of the corporation to
dispose of the grain since, by its interpretation of the Department of Agriculture regulations
concerning C.C.C. loans, the stockholders were ineligible to hypothecate the grain. The court's
uneasiness in this finding (as indicated by its use of "may very well have relied," 41 T.C.
848, "it may well be" Id. at 849, and finally "must have utilized," Id. at 850) is under-
standable in light of the fact that the local office of the Department of Agriculture issued the
loans in the names of the individual stockholders, Id. at 850, and that County Agricultural
Stabilization and Conservation Committee (the body authorized by the Department of
Agriculture to make such findings) decided that the shareholders were eligible for C.C.C.
loans. Petitioner Reply Brief, p. 20.
43. 41 T.C. 840 at 848.
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Trading case as support for the expectation theory. The latter case seemed to
evolve44 the theory from Gregory v. Helvering.45 Mrs. Gregory, the sole share-
holder of X corporation, caused it to transfer a portion of its appreciated invest-
ment portfolio to a newly organized Y corporation. Under the plan she received
all shares of Y corporation. The transaction was a literal compliance with the
reorganization provisions of the Code (similar to present section 355 but without
the latter's conditions) whereby the distribution to Mrs. Gregory of the Y
shares was tax free, those shares taking for a basis a portion of the basis of the
X shares based on their respective fair market values. Had the plan succeeded,
the subsequent liquidation of Y corporation and distribution of its assets to the
shareholder would have allowed her to obtain those assets at capital gain rates,
whereas if they had been obtained directly from X corporation, their value would
have been taxed to her as a dividend. The Court held that the reorganization
failed because the transaction lacked a business purpose and was outside the
plain intent of the statute. The Gregory doctrine has since been applied to a
variety of situations to the defeat of the taxpayer where a transaction is devoid
of any commercial value other than to reduce his taxes.46 Many of the applica-
tions seem irreconcilable but fortunately it will not be necessary to review but
a few to demonstrate that the business purpose doctrine should not affect section
311. In Chisholm v. Commissioner47 Judge Hand spoke of the Gregory case as
follows:
• . . the incorporators adopted the usual form for creating business
corporations; but their intent, or purpose, was merely to draught the
papers, in fact not to create corporations as the court understood that
word. That was the purpose which defeated their exemption, not the
accompanying purpose to escape taxation; that purpose was legally
neutral. Had they really meant to conduct a business by means of the
two reorganized companies, they would have escaped whatever other
aim they might have had, whether to avoid taxes, or to regenerate the
world.
48
In Granite Trust Co. v. United States49 the taxpayer disposed of shares of stock
of a subsidiary days before the stockholders of the latter voted to liquidate. The
taxpayer could then recognize the loss on the liquidation, not being within the
conditions set out by section 332 (b).50 The unanimous court stated:
In the present case the question is whether or not there actually
were sales. Why the parties may wish to enter into a sale is one thing,
but that is irrelevant under the Gregory case so long as the consum-
mated agreement was no different from what it purported to be.51
44. See text accompanying note 27 subra.
45. 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
46. See Surrey & Warren, Federal Income Taxation, p. 1535-46, (1960 ed. 1962).
47. 79 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1935).
48. Id. at 15.
49. 238 F.2d 670 (1st Cir. 1956).
50. After the liquidation, the corporation held 79.5% of the subsidiary's stock. Had
it held 80% the loss would not have been recognized by virtue of § 332(b) (1).
51. Granite Trust Co. v. U.S., 238 F.2d 670, 677 (1st Cir. 1956) ; accord, Kraft Foods
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Applying the above to the instant problem, one can not say that the dividend
in A.B.C.D. Lands should be ignored because it was not really a dividend or
because it had no commercial purpose. The purpose and effect of a dividend is to
get assets from the corporation to its stockholders. Unquestionably, this occurred.
The next question is: Was the method (in kind v. cash) of distributing the assets
realistic and did it have any business purpose? Before answering the question
(which answer may be no) it might be wise to reflect back on the words of the
code and the reports accompanying section 311. If it be necessary to have a
business purpose for a dividend in kind, other than a motive to get as much
money to the stockholder as possible, of what practical value is section 311 ? How
many corporations have stockholders who can utilize the corporation's assets in
a way other than exchanging them for a more liquid commodity? The stock-
holders in General Utilities followed a prearranged plan to sell the assets
(stock) distributed. In United States v. Cummins Distilleries Corp.,52 the
shareholders received warehouse receipts for whiskey which they had no choice
but to sell.5 3 One can hardly think of an asset more useless, if it cannot be sold,
than a fractional share of an electrical transmission line, as the shareholders
received in the Cumberland case. Lest one feel unsure in their difference of
opinion with Judge Learned Hand (who evolved the expectation theory from
Gregory in the Transport Trading case)5 4 he need only take notice of the
following comments of the Second Circuit.
Precise formulation of the Gregory principle has proved somewhat diffi-
cult. There is language in some of our opinions, [citing Transport
Trading] suggesting that Gregory v. Helvering applies to preclude tax
relief as to any transaction the taxpayer entered into solely for the
purpose of avoiding taxes. Such an application of the holding in that
case would be, however, a mistaken oversimplification. The opinion in
Gregory v. Helvering permits proper tax avoidance .... [A]s to many
transactions Congress has clearly intended tax relief irrespective of the
parties' motives. . . .[T]he principle of Gregory v. Helvering would
operate to deny tax relief whenever a transaction was without economic
substance or... was economically unrealistic .... "[I]n either case the
taxpayer must show that his treatment of the transaction does not
conflict with the meaning Congress had in mind when it formulated
the section .... ,,55
Perhaps the foregoing analysis is not necessary to discredit the expectation
theory used in A.B.C.D. Lands. Reference is made to the concurring opinion of
Judge Sibley in the First State Bank case (the only case cited by the Senate
Finance Committee in its report on section 311) :50
Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 118, 127-28 (2d Cir. 1956); Chamberlin v. Commissioner,
207 F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 918 (1953); Annot. 101 A.L.R. 204
(1936).
52. 166 F.2d 17 (6th Cir. 1948).
53. Id. at 21.
54. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
55. Diggs v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 326, 329 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
908 (1960); accord, Humacid Co. 42 T.C. 894, 910 (1964).
56. See note 9 supra.
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It is true that a corporation which is contemplating a sale of its prop-
erty by which a gain will be realized may, before anything is done by
way of sale, decide to distribute the property in kind to its stock-
holders and escape taxation for the gain which it did not realize.
57
That opinion is worthy of the status of existing law, three judges concurring in
it. They with Holmes made the majority of the six judge court.
Even aside from any judicial comments on the subject, the expectation
theory clashes with common sense. To penalize the taxpayer in A.B.C.D. Lands
only because the president had the interests of his stockholders in mind is incon-
sistent with economic reality. It is the legal and moral duty of a corporate
officer to minimize taxes as well as every other corporate expense by any means
not inconsistent with the public good. To say that the company must pay addi-
tional tax because its officer acted in a way he expected would produce a
minimum of tax and which appeared to be condoned by statute and case law,
and imply that another officer going through identical motions for another
company in complete ignorance of the effects of his acts would not be taxed
makes one wonder what type of corporate management the Tax Court is
advocating.
The motive of tax avoidance is not an evil one. It is a citizen's legal right
and a corporate officer's legal duty. In Gregory v. Helvering,5 s the case where
the business purpose doctrine was enunciated the court stated: "The legal right
of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of what otherwise would be his taxes, or
altogether avoid them, by means which the law permits, cannot be doubted." In
the words of Judge Hand:
Over and over again courts have said-that there is nothing sinister in
so arranging one's affairs as to keep taxes as low as possible. Every-
body does so, rich or poor; and all do right, for nobody owes any
public duty to pay more than the law demands: taxes are enforced
exactions, not voluntary contributions. To demand more in the name
of morals is mere cant.
5 9
The use of the expectation theory in imputing a sale to a corporation to
avoid the non-recognition provisions of section 311 is an outgrowth of a mis-
interpretation of the Gregory business purpose doctrine. It fails to recognize the
distinction between planning and conducting one's affairs so as to minimize
one's taxes, and setting up sham or unrealistic transactions to accomplish the
same purpose. The Tax Court's eagerness in A.B.C.D. Lands to exact taxes in a
situation that may have appeared to be a device to avoid them led it to misapply
the imputation of sale doctrine.
57. 168 F.2d 1004, 1011 (5th Cir. 1948) (Emphasis added.) It is clear that the words
"by way of sale" were a reference to who began the negotiations. This is evident from the
examples used later in the concurring opinion to illustrate the distinction.
58. 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935).
59. Commissioner v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 850-51 (2d Cir. 1947) (dissenting opinion),
cert. denied, 331 U.S. 859 (1947); see generally Parshelsky's Estate v. Commissioner,
303 F.2d 14, 19 (2d Cir. 1962).
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In the second part of this comment the government's alternative theory,
that the distribution was an anticipatory assignment of income, will be analyzed.
This alternative concept might well be used to accomplish the same end without
confusing a somewhat settled area of law.
II. ANTICIPATORY ASSIGNMENT OF INCOME
When a corporation declares a dividend (whether liquidating or not) of
"appreciated" property, the corporation will recognize no income on the distribu-
tion (by virtue of sections 311 and 336) provided it passes the test of the
"imputed sale doctrine" (discussed above). However, if the distribution is an
anticipatory assignment of income, sections 311 and 336 are to no avail and the
corporation will be taxed on the "income" involved. That sections 311 and 336
are subject to the anticipatory assignment of income rationale is clear from the
Senate Finance Committee report which stated that those sections were not
meant to alter existing law.60 The case"' cited therein as exemplary of existing
law62 was decided under the rule of anticipatory assignments of income.
The type of appreciation subject to the anticipatory assignment rationale
has been described as "potential income,"0 3 or that of an "essential income
nature." 64 However, determining what appreciation is potential income has been
anything but an easy task, and once potential income has been identified, the
courts must decide how much of it should be taxed to the assignor and how
much to the assignee. The result is a mass of cases which appear to be irrecon-
cilable. Indeed, in "seeking to reconcile the implications of the infinite variety
of facts presented by the decided cases and all that has been said about the
subject of anticipatory assignment of income, one is likely to be displeased with
his own wits; and may find his mind teetering between conflicting conclusions."0 0,
The more important anticipatory assignment of income cases, especially
those which have reached the appellate courts, will be the subject of the following
analysis. It is this writer's contention that the cases are reconcilable into a rela-
tively neat package if the appreciation in question is examined by looking to the
source of its creation 66 rather than its character at the time of distribution and if
60. See footnote 9 supra.
61. Commissioner v. First State Bank of Stratford, 168 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1948),
cert. denied, 335 U.S. 867 (1948), Note, 33 Minn. L. Rev. 794 (1949).
62. For articles discussing these sections see Lyon & Eustice, Assignment of Income:
Fruit and Tree as Irrigated by the P. G. Lake Case, 17 Tax L. Rev. 295 (1962); Mintz &
Plumb, Dividends in Kind-The Thunderbolts and the New Look, 10 Tax L. Rev. 41 (1954).
63. Commissioner v. First State Bank of Stratford, 168 F.2d 1004, 1007 (5th Cir. 1948).
64. Estate of Davison v. United States, 155 Ct. Cl. 290, 301, 292 F.2d 937, 942 (1961),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961).
65. Jones v. Commissioner, 306 F.2d 292, 296 (5th Cir. 1962); see Commissioner v.
Reece, 233 F.2d 30 (1st Cir. 1956).
66. See Friedman v. Commissioner, 346 F.2d 506, 508 (6th Cir. 1965); Wilkinson v.
United States, 157 Ct. Cl. 857, 304 F.2d 469, 474 (1962); cf. Sherlock v. Commissioner,
294 F.2d 863 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 802 (1961); Pridemark Inc., 42 T.C.
510, 536 (1964).
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deference is given to "the first principle of income taxation,167 that is, income
must be taxed to him who earns it.
An appreciated asset is one whose market value exceeds basis. There are
three forces which combine with time to cause a diversity between market value
and basis. After acquisition, (assuming cost equals basis) external market
factors may cause value appreciation. For example, World War II caused a rise
in steamship values. Likewise, a favorable economic forecast may cause a rise
in stock prices. A second force causing a divergence between market value and
basis is that of personal services, e.g., a person generating accounts receivable by
the rendition of personal services. The increasing market value of the accounts
reflects the value of the services while the basis remains at zero. Similarly, the
earning power of an investment in bonds is reflected in the value of interest
coupons while their basis in the bondholder's hands remains at zero. Tax deduc-
tions may act as the third cause of appreciation. Even though the deductions
(e.g., depreciation) cause the basis to decline, market value may remain constant
or diminish more slowly than the basis.
Where appreciated property is assigned and the appreciation has been
caused by the first type of force, namely external market factors, the anticipatory
assignment of income rationale does not apply. Such was the case in General
Utilities where appreciated investment stock was distributed. 8 However, where
the appreciation is due to the other two forces, alone or in combination, the
courts generally have applied the anticipatory assignment of income rationale
to distributions otherwise protected by sections 311 and 336. The following
discussion will deal with the cases where the appreciation in question represented
an "ordinary income" accumulation due to the exertion of personal services or
investment in property, and that due to the reduction of basis by tax deductions.
A. Assignments of appreciation due to personal services or investments in
property
The underlying principle of the anticipatory assignment of income rationale
is that income must be taxed to him who earns it. The principle was formulated
by the Supreme Court in 1930 in Lucas v. Earl.08 In that case a husband and
wife, both cash basis taxpayers, in 1901 assigned to each other one-half of their
respective future earnings. The Court had before it the issue of whether the
husband's 1920 and 1921 earnings (by way of attorney's fees) were taxable to,
him alone, as opposed to he and his wife each being taxable on one-half the
earnings. Not questioning the validity of the assignment, the court, treating
the fees as salaries, held that the statute was meant to tax salaries to those who.
earned them and anticipatory arrangements and contracts, however skillfully
devised, could not prevent the salary when paid from vesting in he who earned
67. Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 739 (1948).
68. See text accompanying footnote 5 supra; accord, Doyle v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d
769, 771 (4th Cir. 1945).
69. 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
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them.70 Therein Justice Holmes uttered his famous horticultural metaphor,
stating that arrangements "by which the fruits are attributed to a different tree
from that on which they grew" 7' would not be allowed for tax purposes.
In 1940 the Supreme Court decided Helvering v. Horst72 where the income
involved was the fruit of a man's property rather than his labors. In Horst a
cash basis taxpayer owned coupon bonds. Shortly before their due date, he gave
the negotiable coupons to his son who in the same year collected them at
maturity. The Court held that the principle of Lucas v. Earl controlled, seeing
no "adequate basis for distinguishing between a gift of interest coupons . . .
and a gift of salary or commissions."73 Hence, the proposition that income is to
be taxed to him who earns it was extended to earnings characterized as interest
on an investment.
A second significant principle emerged from Horst because the coupons
were given between interest dates. Therefore at least part of the interest was
earned after the coupons had been given to the son. The interest earned after
the gift as well as that earned prior to the gift was taxable to the donor
because in holding the underlying property, the bonds, he was earning74 the
income regardless of the fact that he previously disposed of the right to have the
income paid to him.75 Later cases have highlighted the fact that when the as-
signor disposes of the income-producing property, any income accrued at the
date of the assignment is chargeable to the assignor.70 Thus it appears that the
70. Id. at 114.
71. Id. at 115.
72. 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
73. Id. at 120; accord, Commissioner v. J. S. Abercrombie Corp., 162 F.2d 338, 340
(5th Cir. 1947).
74. The court distinguished Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937) where the donor
assigned his right to receive income from a trust. The gift of the life estate was deemed
to be a gift of the income producing property. The income paid to the donee was held
taxable to him, not the donor. The Horst court stated:
Since the gift [in Blair] was deemed to be a gift of the property, the income from
it was held to be the income of the owner of the property, who was the donee . . .
a refinement which was unnecessary if the respondent's contention here is right,
but one clearly inapplicable to gifts of interest (alone) or wages. 311 U.S. at 118,
119 (1940). (Emphasis added.)
75. Other cases, decided just before or soon after Horst recognized the principle that
the holder of the income producing property should be charged with its income. In Burnet
v. Leninger, 285 U.S. 136 (1932), a husband who claimed he assigned one-half of his
partnership to his wife was taxed on all the income of his original share. Since it was neces-
sary to find the assignment of the corpus ineffective, the court must have felt that the
holder of the income producing asset was chargeable with its income. In Pearce v. Commis-
sioner, 315 U.S. 543 (1942), a husband pursuant to a divorce settlement purchased an
annuity to pay alimony to his wife. The income was not taxable to him because he parted
with the corpus which created the interest portion of the annuity payments. Id. at 554.
See Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948); Gait v. Commissioner, 216 F.2d 41 (7th
Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 951 (1955); Rudco Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 113 Ct.
Cl. 206, 82 F. Supp. 746 (1949); Drake University, 44 T.C. 70 (1965); Annot. 151 A.L.R.
1401(1944); cf. United States v. Joliet & Chicago R.R. Co., 315 U.S. 44 (1942); see also
Commissioner v. Slagter, 238 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1956).
76. Friedman v. Commissioner, 346 F.2d 506 (6th Cir. 1965) (an endowment policy
just before maturity was given to a charity, the excess of the market value over basis which
was due to interest accumulations was held taxable to the donor) ; Smith's Estate v. Com-
missioner, 292 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 967 (1962) (donor of stock
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courts are striving to reach a goal in taxation that is in accord with "economic"
common sense. If the word "income" means "an accretion in wealth," then, at
the end of the year a taxpayer has income by virtue of salaries due him for
services he performed even though he may not be paid for some time. Likewise,
if a taxpayer lends $1000 at 6 per cent on July 1st to be repaid a year later, on
December 31st he is $30 richer even though no payment has been received.
Assuming that the debtor is a good credit risk, the taxpayer has an asset he
could sell for about $1030. Hence, it would be inconsistent with the rule that
income should be taxed to him who earns it to allow that taxpayer to dispose of
the accretion in wealth which his property earned without paying the tax thereon.
Similarly, if the creditor retains the claim for the $1000 principal and assigns
all future interest payments, he should not be allowed to dispense with that
taxable income since it is his principal which will earn the income. Apparently
this was the thinking of the Supreme Court in both the Earl and the Horst
cases, when it stated income is not to be attributed to a tree different from that
on which it grew. The rationale applies equally to accrued income on a gift of
property77 and income "earned" by the assignor's property after the right to
collect it is assigned.78
Normally, a taxpayer does not take earnings into income until they are
realized and realization does not occur for a cash basis taxpayer until the income
is paid to him. 79 In both the Earl and Horst cases, the cash basis taxpayers
were charged with the income even though there had been no realization in the
conventional sense. The Horst court disposed of the apparent inconsistency as
follows:
... the rule that income is not taxable until realized has never been
taken to mean that the taxpayer, even on the cash receipts basis, who
taxed on accrued dividend paid to donee); First Nat'l. Bank of St. Elmo v. United States,
194 F.2d 389, 392 (7th Cir. 1952) (royalties on oil and gas wells not paid but earned before
transfer of the producing property, held taxable to distributing corporation); Austin v.
Commissioner, 161 F.2d, 666 (6th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 767 (1947); (interest
earned to the date of a gift of promissory notes, paid afterwards, was taxed to the donor) ;
Anthony's Estate v. Commissioner, 155 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1946) (taxpayer who in 1937
gave an interest in an oil and gas lease along with impounded income thereon was taxed
on it when to the donee in 1940) ; Estate of Holmes, 1 T.C. 508 (1943) (donor of stock taxed
on dividends declared but not paid) ; See Palmer v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 434, 438 (9th Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 821 (1959); Cold Metal Process Co. V. Commissioner, 247 F.2d
864, 872 (6th Cir. 1957); United States v. Lynch, 192 F.2d 718, 721 (9th Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 343 U.S. 934 (1952); Doyle v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1945); compare
James M. Pierce Corp., 326 F.2d 67 (8th Cir. 1964); Commissioner v. Montgomery, 144
F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1944).
77. Ibid. The same rationale supports the change of accounting allowed in the cases
cited in notes 94-96, 100, supra. Contra, Humacid, 42 T.C. 894, 913 (1964).
78. Mintz & Plumb, supra note 61 at 48; see text accompanying note 74 supra. It
should be noted that the anticipatory assignment of income rationale applies only when the
assignor owns the income producing property in question. Hence, the problem of control
in Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937), Harrison v. Shaffner, 312 U.S. 579 (1941)
and the Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940), line of cases presents a separate issue
wherein it must be determined that the assignor does own the property, for tax purposes,
before the assignment of income rationale can be applied to assignments of future income
due to investments in property.
79. Treas. Reg. 1.446-1 (c) (1) (i).
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has fully enjoyed the benefit of the economic gain represented by his
right to receive income, can escape taxation because he has not himself
received payment of it from his obligor. The rule, founded on adminis-
trative convenience, is only one of postponement of the tax to the final
event of enjoyment of the income, usually the receipt of it by the
taxpayer, and not one of exemption from the taxation when the enjoy-
ment is consummated by some event other than the taxpayer's personal
receipt of money or propertysO
Another way of stating the proposition is that income will be taxed to him who
earns it and this principle will not be defeated by a rule which for administrative
convenience defers realization of income beyond the point where it represents
"economic gain." The taxpayer in Horst "procured payment of the interest...
to a member of his family." 81 The exercise of the power to assign the income and
the enjoyment of seeing his son collect it, served in lieu of conventional realiza-
tion to make the income taxable to the father.8 2 Though the issue did not arise in
Horst since the assignment occurred in the same tax year as payment, other
cases have held that the assignor will not be taxed until the assignee collects,
when payment occurs in a tax year after the assignment.8 3 These cases are not
inconsistent with Horst, which spoke of the "procuring '84 of payment, implying
that the payment itself as opposed to assignment of the right to collect alone, is
necessary for the Horst type of realization.85 Thus, the rationale of anticipatory
assignment of income is concerned with who shall be charged with income and
does not deal with the when of taxation. It simply treats the assignor as if he
collected the assigned income and then paid it to the assignee.
The rationale of anticipatory assignment of income is complicated by one
more variable. If the income at the time of the assignment is uncertain" the
80. 311 U.s. at 116.
81. Id. at 117.
82. To say that one who has made a gift thus derived from interest or earnings
paid to his donor has never enjoyed or realized the fruits of his investment or
labor, because he has assigned them instead of collecting them himself and then
paying them over to the donor, is to affront common understanding and to deny
the facts of common experience . . . . The power to dispose of income is the
equivalent of ownership of it. The exercise of that power to procure the payment
of income to another is the enjoyment, and hence the realization, of the income
by him who exercises it. Id. at 117, 118.
83. Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940); Straus v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 441
(2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 858 (1948); Anthony's Estate v. Commissioner, 155
F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1946); Duran v. Commissioner, 123 F.2d 324 (10th Cir. 1941); Rev.
Rul. 275, 1958-1 Cum. Bull. 22; see J. Ungar, Inc. v. Commissioner, 244 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.
1957); Rudolph, The Realization Requirement and Tax Avoidance, 62 Mich. L. Rev. 961,
967 (1964); Lyons & Eustice, note 61 supra at 356; see also Commissioner v. First State
Bank of Matador, 172 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1949), reversing 6 C.C.H. Tax. Ct. Mem. 1047
(1947) (The case seems to hold on the basis of First State Bank of Stratford, 168 F.2d
1004, 1008 (5th Cir. 1948), that only the income collected is taxable.) ; Eugene T. Flewellen,
32 T.C. 317, 322 (1959)X
84. See note 82 supra; Annie A. Colby, 45 B.T.A. 536 (1941).
85. But see, Rudolph, supra note 83 at 963.
86. The economist (thinking in terms of accretions in wealth) would probably dis-
tinguish between uncertainty as to value versus uncertainty of existence of the "income."
In the former case there is some accretion in wealth, although it may require an estimate
to value it. In the latter case the uncertainty as to existence does not lend itself to approxi-
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assignor will not be required to pay the tax levied on it. If the person who is to
pay the income is in default and if there is considerable doubt as to collectability
of the income, the transferor will not be taxed if the transferee collects.87 The
fact that a lawsuit is in process to enforce the collection creates sufficient un-
certainty to prevent the income from being charged to the transferor.88 This
exemption for income which is uncertain can also be supported by the concept
that he who earns the income should pay the tax. If payment is contingent,
additional effort must be expended to remove the contingency and until this is
done, the income is not fully earned8 9 and as such should not be taxed.
The above discussion yields the following rules:
1. Income will be taxed to him who earns it.
2. The income in question may be earned by the exertion of personal
services or investment of assets in income producing property.
3. Since the holder of income producing property is earning the in-
come it produces, if the property is transferred the income earned
up to the time of transfer is taxable to the donor.
4. If a taxpayer has earned the income described above in rules 2 & 3,
he may not by assignment before it is paid9" avoid the payment of
tax, because the procurement of payment to another will be con-
strued as realization.
5. In all cases, in order for the income to be considered earned, it
must have reached a degree of certainty of payment so that the
payment is not much more than a formality.
The above principles, drawn mainly from cases involving individuals, can
be applied to prevent the application of sections 311 and 336 to corporate dis-
tributions.91 In addition the rationale has enabled the Commissioner to use
mation in dollar amounts and is of questionable value. The courts have not chosen to
recognize the distinction.
87. Jones v. Commissioner, 306 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1962); Wellhouse v. Tomilson,
197 F.S. 739 (D.C.S.D. Fla. 1961); Cold Metal Process Co. v. Commissioner, 247 F.2d 864
(6th Cir. 1957); Telephone Directory Advertising Co. v. United States, 135 Ct. Cl. 670,
142 F. Supp. 884 (1956); Commissioner v. Timken, 141 F.2d, 625 (6th Cir. 1944); but see
J. Ungar, Inc. v. Commissioner, 244 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1957).
88. Jones v Commissioner, note 87 supra; Cotnam v. Commissioner, 263 F.2d 119
(5th Cir. 1959); Cold Metal Process Co. v. Commissioner, note 87 supra; Commissioner v.
Henry Hess Co., 210 F.2d 553 (9th Cir. 1954); Weller v. Brownell, 240 F. Supp. 201, 211-12
(M.D. Pa. 1965); compare Anthony's Estate v. Commissioner, 155 F.2d 980, 982 (10th Cir.
1946) to the effect that a lien of a creditor against the claim (to income). does not create
a sufficient contingency so as to ignore the income.
89. See Cotnam v. Commissioner, note 88 supra; Cold Metal Process Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 247 F.2d, 864, 872 (6th Cir. 1957). But see, O'Brien, 38 T.C. 707 (1962), aff'd per
curiant, 319 F.2d 532 (3rd Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 931 (1963).
90. Whether the income is earned before or after the assignment is irrelevant. Note
that in Horst part of the income was earned before and part after the assignment, since
the coupons were given between interest dates. As to assignments of income produced by
personal services, in Earl income was taxed to the assignor who before he earned it assigned
the right to receive it and in Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940), a companion case
to Horst, the Supreme Court held that commissions earned, in writing insurance policies,
were taxable to the assignor who assigned them after they had been fully earned. See
Pleason v. Commissioner, 226 F.2d 732 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1006 (1955);
Straus v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 441 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 858 (1948).
91. Rudco Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 113 Ct. Cl. 206, 82 F. Supp. 746 (1949);
see Louisiana Irrigation & Mill Co., 14 CCH Tax Ct. Mei. 1252 (1955), see cases cited
in note 103 infra.
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another tool provided by the Code, that is, the power to change a taxpayer's
method of accounting if his regular method does not clearly reflect income.92
Suppose a case where a corporation, a cash basis taxpayer, liquidates on De-
cember 31, when it has certain moneys due it for sales made near the end of the
year. Assume that the accounts receivable are collected after the corporation
has gone out of existence. Rather than wait until the income is paid and try to
assess tax against the nonexistent corporation, the Commissioner may change
the taxpayer's method of accounting to the accrual method, under which the
income has been realized.93 Thus, when the corporation in liquidation distributes
accounts receivable generated either by services, 94 by the sale of products,95 or
by lending money 6 the Commissioner has been allowed to change the method
of accounting from the cash to the accrual method. Since the income is considered
earned in the Lucas v. Earl sense, the change of accounting merely advances the
time of conventional realization to more clearly reflect income. These cases are
comparatively harsh on the taxpayers since the method of accounting is changed
only for the specific transaction in question, not the entire year, possibly creating
an income bunching problem.97 Like the cash method of accounting, the com-
pleted contract method9" (used for long term construction contracts) tends to
defer the recognition of income beyond the point in time when it is earned in an
economic sense. When the contract is half completed one-half the profit has been
"earned." Where a liquidating corporation on the completed contract method of
accounting distributes to its shareholders partially completed contracts the
92. § 446 Int. Rev. Code of 1954,
(b) Exceptions-If no method of accounting has been regularly used by the tax-
payer, or if the method used does not clearly reflect income, the computation of
taxable income shall be made under such method as, in the opinion of the Secre-
tary or his delegate, does dearly reflect income.
The relevant wording of Section 41 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 is substantially
identical.
93. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1 (c) (ii) states:
.under an accrual method, income is to be included for the taxable year when
all the events have occurred which fx the right to receive such income and the
amount thereof can be determined with reasonable accuracy.
94. Williamson v. United States, 155 Ct. Cl. 301, 292 F.2d 524 (1961); Susan 3.
Carter, 9 T.C. 364, 373 (1947), aff'd 170 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1948), see discussion in rarer,
Corporate Liquidations; Transmuting Ordinary Income into Capitol Gains, 75 Harv. L. Rev.
527 (1962) ; accord, Family Record Plan, Inc. v. Commissioner, 309 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1962);
cert. denied, 373 U.S. 910 (1963); Wood Harmon Corp. v. United States, 311 F.2d 918 (2d
Cir. 1963); Stephen S. Townsend, 37 T.C. 830 (1962); cf. Sanford Reffett, 39 T.C. 869
(1963).
95. Floyd v. Scofield, 193 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1952).
96. Idaho First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 265 F.2d 6 (9th Cir. 1959).
97. If the accounting method was changed for the entire year or period it would
force an adjustment for similar overlapping items earned in a previous year but collected
in the period of liquidation. Notwithstanding the "income bunching" problem created by
adding the additional items at year end the Commissioner has been allowed to change the
method only for the items in question. See Williamson v. United States, note 94 supra;
Susan 3. Carter, note 94, supra.
98. Under the completed contract method of accounting no income is taken into ac-
count until the year (the contract may span many years) when the contract is completed.
In that year the total contract price is taken into income and all expenses allocable thereto
are then deductible. See Treas. Reg. 1A51-3(b) (2).
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Commissioner has been allowed to change the corporation's method of accounting
to the percentage of completion method"
9 which would reflect this earned
income. 0 0
B. Assignments of appreciation due to tax deductions
The assignment of income rationale has also been applied where the ap-
preciation in property was caused by deductions from basis. The leading case is
Commissioner v. First State Bank of Stratford.
1 1 There the bank prior to 1942,
had written off as worthless notes which appeared uncollectable. In 1942 when it
appeared that some would be collected, the bank declared a dividend of those
notes. The Commissioner included the 1942 collections in the bank's income.
Speaking for the court, Justice Holmes stated:
It is well settled that, when a deduction for income-tax purposes is
taken and allowed for debts deemed worthless, recoveries on the debts
in a later year constitute taxable income for that year to the extent
that a tax benefit was received from the deduction taken in a prior year.
Thus when the tax benefit for a bad debt is obtained, the debt loses its
nature as capital and becomes representative of that portion of the
taxpayer's income which was not taxed . . . The profits or income
used to pay back the capital when the debt is charged off is repre-
sented by the worthless loan, so that when such loan is paid the profits
are replaced.'
02
Other cases have dealt with the attempted assignment of an asset whose
appreciation was due to tax write-offs and held their assignment would not
preclude taxation of the person who benefited from the deduction.
10 3 As Justice
Holmes reasoned in First State Bank the "appreciation" merely represents
untaxed income or earnings of a prior year. Similarly, Congress recognized the
99. Under the percentage of completion method of accounting, a percentage of the
total contract price that corresponds with the percentage of the work completed is taken
into income and all expenses to date are deductible. Treas. Reg. 1.451-3(b) (1).
100. Jud Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 681, (5th Cir. 1946);
accord, Commissioner v. Kuckenberg, 309 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S.
909 (1963); Palmer v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
821 (1959); Dillard-Waltermire, Inc. v. Campbell, 255 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1958); Standard
Paving Co. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1951)- cert. denied, 342 U.S. 860
(1951).
101. 168 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 867 (1948), Note, 33 Minn.
L. Rev. 794 (1949).
102. Id. at 1006 (Emphasis added.); accord, First State Bank of Matador, 172 F.2d 224
(5th Cir. 1949), reversing 6 T.C.M. 1047 (1947).
103. West Seattle Nat'l Bank of Seattle v. Commissioner, 288 F.2d 47 (9th Cir. 1961),
where amounts deducted for bad debt reserves were found taxable to the transferor in a
liquidation pursuant to § 337. Citizens Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Cleveland v. United States,
154 Ct. Cl. 305, 290 F.2d 932 (1961), where deductions creating a "Federal Insurance
Reserve" were deemed recovered in a liquidation pursuant to §§ 336 and 337 and were
treated as income to the transferor rather than property; accord, Arcadia Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Commissioner, 300 F.2d 247 (9th Cir. 1962); see Note, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 780, 790
(1963); cf. James M. Pierce Corp. v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 67 (8th Cir. 1964). But see,
Gutkin & Beck, Section 337: IRS wrong in taxing, at time of liquidation, items previously
deducted, 17 J. Taxation 146 (1962).
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income nature of the recovery of depreciation deductions when it enacted
sections 1245 and 1250.104
There appears to be one basic proposition which controls the result in the
anticipatory assignment of income cases. Where a person or entity has in an
economic sense "earned" income, that is, done all that is necessary to be
legally entitled to it, that person or entity may not avoid the tax by assigning'0 5
to another the right to be paid that income. In the case of individuals, the
prohibition is necessary to protect the graduated tax system (so that high bracket
taxpayers may not assign income to low bracket taxpayers). In the case of
corporations it is the corporate tax that must be protected. Were it not for the
anticipatory assignment of income rationale, corporations could under sections
311 or 336 by way of dividends in kind distribute to shareholders property with
"attached" income (i.e., accrued interest on bonds) or a pure income item
(accounts receivable) under the guise of "property" and thereby avoid tax at
the corporate level.
C. Assignments of appreciated agricultural products
The assignment of income doctrine has also been prominent in cases in-
volving agricultural products. Many of these cases are not reconcilable with the
aforementioned principles. However, the problems are attributable for the most
part to the regulations which control accounting techniques for farmers. The
regulations tend to defer realization of a farmer's income beyond the time
when, in an economic sense, it is fully earned. They provide that cash basis
farmers shall not include crops or livestock in income until they are sold. 0'
Farmers on the accrual method of accounting shall not include in income the
value of crops until they become products, 0 7 that is, until they are severed from
the land. 08 Also, crop shares received from a tenant farmer (whether or not
considered rent under state law) are not included in income until the year they
are reduced to money or its equivalent. 0 9 By virtue of these regulations, a cash
method farmer can raise cattle and realize no income until he sells them. This
is so even though his herd may have multiplied and would seem to represent a
104. These sections, effective for depreciation deductions taken for years after 1962
(§ 1245), and after 1963 (§ 1250), in effect remove from capital gains treatment that por-
tion of an asset's "appreciation" which is due to its depreciation deductions.
105. Whether the assignment is a distribution by a corporation or a gift by a non-
corporate taxpayer seems irrelevant as long as the income involved has met the other tests
of the anticipatory assignment of income rationale. See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112
(1940); Friedman v. Commissioner, 346 F.2d 506 (6th Cir. 1965) (gifts); United States
v. Joliet & Chicago R.R. Co., 315 U.S. 44 (1942); Wood Harmon Corp. v. United States,
311 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1963); Commissioner v. First State Bank of Stratford, 168 F.2d 1004
(5th Cir. 1948); Jud Plumbing & Heating Inc. v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 681 (5th Cir,
1946); Williamson v. United States, 155 Ct. Cl. 301, 292 F.2d 524 (1961) (corporate
dividends).
106. See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-4 (a) (1954).
107. See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-4 (b) (1954).
108. See S. J. Perry, 58-2 U.S.T.C. 9587 (1958); I.T. 1368, I-1 Cum. Bull. 72 (1922),
holding that farmers may not include in income, the value of growing crops.
109. Treas. Reg. 1.61-4(a) (1954), (cash method farmers), 1.61-4(b) (1954) (ac-
crual method farmers).
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definite accession to his wealth. An accrual method farmer may have fully
grown crops ready to harvest at the end of his tax year, but he realizes no
income since a farmer may not take into income the value of growing crops.
110
This too is economically unrealistic since the growing crops represent an incre-
ment in wealth. Also, neither cash nor accrual basis farmers realize income upon
receipt of crops paid as rent by tenant farmers even though they are severed
from the land and represent rental income which can be readily valued. The
usual rules regarding realization upon payment in kind do not apply.
The delay in recognition of income allowed by these regulations creates
problems in the agricultural area that are not encountered elsewhere. In
Campbell v. Prothro"' a cash basis farmer donated cattle, which he had raised,
to a charity. The expenses incurred in producing the cattle had been deducted
so the cattle had a zero basis. The Commissioner contended that the donor
realized income upon the making of the gift to the extent of the fair market
value of the cattle. In finding for the taxpayer, the Court referred to the cattle
as property and analogized them to the principal (bonds) in Horst.112 The Court
spoke of the appreciation in value as if it were unrealized appreciation in a
capital asset." 3 However, the appreciation in Prothro was not all due to market
factors. The value of the calves was due to the farmer's investment in his
pastures and herd, his labor, and the feed and other items consumed by the
cattle for which the farmer had been allowed deductions. Unlike appreciation
which is the product of market factors, the value accumulation in Prothro at the
time of assignment represented the normal "recurring" fruit of investment and
labor. It was akin to the "salary" earned in Lucas v. Earl and the interest earned
by the money investment in Horst. Also, part of the value was due to prior tax
deductions, as in the Stratford Bank case. Admittedly, part of the appreciation
may have been due to market factors, but this fact should not be allowed to
camouflage the presence of value which, in cases not involving agricultural
products, falls within the assignment of income rationale.
Once it is recognized that the agricultural product may be composed of an
accumulation of "ordinary income" it becomes clear that the regulation defer-
ring recognition of income until the product is sold should not allow the assignor
of the product to avoid tax on the "ordinary income" accrued at the time of
assignment." 4 As the Supreme Court stated in Horst, the rule of realization has
never been taken to mean that one who earns income may avoid its tax by
assigning it for another to collect." 5 The fact that the agricultural product
(whether livestock or grain) may be "property" in a common law sense does not
in itself preclude use of the assignment of income rationale. Recall that the
110. See note 108, supra.
111. 209 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1954).
112. Id. at 335.
113. Ibid.
114. See cases cited in note 76, supra; But see Lyons & Eustice, note 61, supra at 382
(footnote 336).
115. See text accompanying note 80, supra.
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bond coupons in Horst could have been called property l 0 as could the accounts
receivable in Williamson. The courts only succeeded in applying the anticipatory
assignment of income rationale in those cases by looking at who created the asset,
and how it was created. Once the nature of the appreciation is seen as deriving
from "ordinary income" factors, the doctrine applies.
In agricultural product cases, the Prothro Court, and also the Tax Court,
117
have confused appreciation due to "earnings" and prior deductions, with market
appreciation and thus seem to have mistakenly limited the assignment of
income doctrine.
The inconsistent decisions in agricultural cases involving anticipatory
assignments of income have plagued the Internal Revenue Service in the area
of corporate distributions. Commissioner v. South Lake Farms Inc."18 is an
example. A corporation purchased the stock of another corporation, planning to
liquidate it. The subsidiary held farm lands and had deducted the expenses of
cultivating and seeding the land. In an "upstream liquidation" the subsidiary
invoked provisions of the code (sec. 336 among them) which were followed to the
letter and guaranteed a tax-free distribution of the assets. The Commissioner
invoked section 446(b) (change of accounting) and proposed that the value of
the crops at liquidation should be included in income or in the alternative that
the expenses allowable thereto should be disallowed. In affirming the Tax Court,
the Ninth Circuit refused to rule that income was "earned" so as to be
accruable under any method of accounting. Therefore, section 446 (b) was to no
avail. Similarly, the Court would not disallow the expenses under the "tax
benefit" principle because the ". . . corporation received nothing""19 by way of
recovery of a previous deduction. One writer has suggested that the subsidiary
116. See the dissenting opinions of Justice McReynolds in Helvering v. Horst, 311
U.S. 112, 121 (1940) and in Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122, 126 (1940); Doyle v.
Commissioner, 147 F.2d 769, 772 (4th Cir. 1945).
117. In Elsie SoRelle, 22 T.C. 459, 478 (1954), the taxpayer succeeded in assigning un-
harvested wheat without paying tax on any income represented by the appreciated value
of the crop because the crop was property. In Louisiana Irrigation & Mill Co., 14 C.C.H.
Tax Ct. Mem. 1252 (1955), a corporation paid a dividend in kind of a rice inventory it
obtained for irrigation services, the Tax Court finding the distribution one of property
rather than income, and in Estate of W. G. Farrier, 15 T.C. 277, 284 (1950), cattle raised
by the estate were distributed to beneficiaries without income tax effect to the estate, the
court deeming the distribution one of property. It should be noted however, that the opinions
in the above cases made no mention of a sale after the assignment, which would have
been necessary for realization to the distributor under the anticipatory assignment of income
rationale. Note 83, supra. However, the Courts did not dispose of the cases on that ground.
Stuart A. Rogers, 38 T.C. 785 (1962) more recently presented the issue in the context
of income which received capital gain treatment. There, the "gain" on the sale of an equity
in a timber tract which had been given to a charity was involved. The court felt that the
case was "simple" since the donor parted with the property which produced the income.
Id. at 789. The source of the appreciation was never discussed. If the "appreciation" was
due to an increase in the market value of trees, the court was correct, but if the "apprecia-
tion" was an accumulation of the year to year growth of the trees, an accretion not unlike
the interest on a coupon bond, the decision was incorrect (assuming capital gain can be
subject to the rationale) because "income" was given, and the producing property (the
land, or the lease) remained in the hands of the transferor. Accord, White v. Brodrick, 104
F. Supp. 213 (D. Kans. 1952), appeal dismissed, 198 F.2d 751 (10th Cir. 1952).
118. 324 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1963), affirming 36 T.C. 1027 (1961).
119. 324 F.2d at 839.
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should have been required to inventory the costs of cultivation, etc. rather than
being allowed to deduct them.120 This solution seems proper in this case as well
as in the Prothro type case where livestock is the subject of a gift. By reducing
the cost of goods sold the greater part of the "income assigned" would thus be
taxed to the assignor. Yet, it would be more accurate to require the subsidiary
to take the value of the crops at the distribution date into income in the year
of the sale. Such a valuation would represent its economic gain and would not be
inconsistent with the rationale of Horst and its successors. Admittedly, there may
be a problem in arriving at the value of the crops at the distribution date, but
it is not an insurmountable one. 121 If it is, the cases should be decided on that
basis.
In A.B.C.D. Lands, Inc.122 the Commissioner's alternative theory was that
the dividend in kind of crops was an anticipatory assignment of income. Had the
case not been decided on the imputed income theory, it would have provided
an interesting test of the assignment of income rationale. Recall that under the
regulations neither cash nor accrual basis taxpayers recognize income upon
receipt of crops as rent until the crops are reduced to cash.123 Although there
may be a practical basis' 24 for the regulation, it allows the farmer to accumulate
the value of his earnings as a landlord in an asset which the courts are later
reluctant to call income.' 25 The Tax Court in A.B.C.D. Lands would have had to
either discredit the previous agricultural decisions, 126 or decide for the taxpayer
even though the crops, received as rent for the use of the farms, represented the
corporation's return on its investment in those farmlands. They represented
ordinary income as much as the coupons did in Horst, and should have been
subject to the assignment of income rationale, which would require the corpora-
tion to take into income in the year of payment to the assignee the value of the
crops at the distribution date. A step in the right direction was taken in Estate
of Davison v. United States12 7 where the Court of Claims was faced with the
120. Eustice, Contract Rights, Capital Gain, and Assignment of Income-the Ferrer
Case, 20 Tax L. Rev. 1, 64 (1964). The use of an inventory procedure would in a sense
capitalize the costs of producing the crop. The costs would be deferred to the year of sale.
Since no sale occurred in South Lake the subsidiary corporation would not have benefit of
deducting the costs. At least this is the position of the Internal Revenue Service. Rev. Rul.
138, 1955-1 Cum. Bull. 223; Rev. Rul. 531, 1955-2 Cum. Bull. 520 (denying deductions for
current costs and costs accumulated in beginning inventories of farm products made the
subject of a charitable contribution); Rev. Rul. 490, 1957-2 Cum. Bull. 231; (denying
similar deductions to a corporation on dividend in kind of non-agricultural inventory
products).
121. See note 86, supra.
122. 41 T.C. 840 (1964).
123. Note 109, supra.
124. Under the regulation the landlord farmer can feed the crops to his livestock
realizing no income on the crops (other that he increased value of the animal which the
accrual basis farmer takes into income)l and be in the same position as the farmer who grew
his own crops and fed them to his livestock. Rev. Rul. 496, 1956-2 C.B. 17.
125. See Louisiana Irrigation & Mill Co., 14 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1252 (1955); contra,
Rev. Rul. 66, 1963-1 Cum. Bull. 13.
126. See cases cited in note 117, supra.
127. 155 Ct. Cl. 290, 292 F.2d 937 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961).
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problem of crop rents which were due under contracts made by the deceased, but
not collected and sold until after her death. The issue was whether the crop
shares were income in respect of decedent which would be taxed to the decedent's
estate when received, and subject to estate tax. 128 The court held that the crops
were of an "essential income nature"'1 9 in the hands of the deceased. The only
thing preventing the crop rents from being taxable as income in the hands of the
deceased was the regulation which deferred the income to a point where the crops
were reduced to cash. Similar to the way the Horst court would not allow the
concept of realization to prevent income (an economic accretion in wealth)
from being taxed to him that earned it, the Davison court did not allow the
landlord-farmer rent regulation, which it considered as simply for administrative
convenience, to prevent the crop rents from being characterized as income. The
case is well reasoned and provides the starting point for bringing the agricul-
tural cases in line with the other cases decided under the anticipatory assignment
of income rationale.
CONCLUSION
In any system of taxation, two basic questions must be answered. What to
tax and when to tax it. In the case of a progressive income tax, as illustrated by
Lucas v. Earl, a third question becomes paramount: who should be taxed. If the
regulations concerning the when in income taxation defer realization beyond the
time when there is true economic gain, albeit for good reason, should taxpayers
be allowed to use them to determine "who should be taxed?" The Supreme Court
in Horst answered No. The when should not control the who. Similarly, in later
non-agricultural assignment of income cases, whether corporate distributions or
personal gifts were involved, courts have refused to allow principles deferring
realization, such as those involving accounting methods, to change the taxable
person. The courts should take the same approach in the agricultural cases, as
did the Davison court, if they are to reach decisions consistent with the other
assignment of income cases.'3 0 The net result will be that corporations dis-
tributing appreciated property will not be taxed on the appreciation by virtue of
sections 311 & 336 where the appreciation is due to market factors, but will be
taxed when it represents an accumulation of ordinary income resulting from its
day to day operations. THOMAS L. DAVID
128. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 691.
129. 155 Ct. Cl. at 301, 292 F.2d at 942.
130. If it were recognized that agricultural products may be income, at least in part,
and as such should be subject to the assignment of income rationale, an annoying problem
may still exist where the assignee delays in selling the product. Since the cash basis assignor
will not be taxed until the income is paid to the assignee (note 83 supra) there will be no
realization and hence no taxable income to the assignor if the assignee never sells the
product. The situation is not improbable where the assignee receives livestock and chooses to
develop his herd and sell only its offspring. The perhaps undesirable result is not the
fault of the assignment of income rationale since the result would be identical absent the
assignment. The assignment of income rationale dealing with the who of taxation cannot
be expected to solve the problems created by regulations determining the when of taxation.
The when could be changed by a revision of the regulations providing an earlier realization
when farm products are assigned.
